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Nationalism, Social Movement Theory and the Grass Roots Movement of Kosovo Serbs, 1985-1988
Nebojša Vladisavljević (LSE)
The mid-1980S witnessed the rise of grass roots protest in Kosovo, a peripheral region of socialist Yugoslavia. In contrast to the 1981 demonstrations, the interaction with the authorities unfolded largely without violence, and instead of Kosovo Albanians the protesters were now Kosovo Serbs. The argument offered in this article consists of two parts. In the historical part I provide evidence that the grass roots mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs predated the rise to power of Milošević and that, despite interaction, and sometimes co-operation, with the authorities the movement remained an autonomous political factor. I also show that the grass roots movement had a disproportionate impact on political developments in Yugoslavia in the late 1980s. Partly under the impact of the movement's activities, long-existing divisions within and among political elites, including factional struggle within Serbia's leadership and conflict among leaders of republics and autonomous provinces, turned into an open conflict. Moreover, the movement's action opened the socialist regime for other non-state actors, which resulted in mobilisation across Serbia and Montenegro. Finally, the movement left a legacy of protest politics that affected strategies of subsequent challenger groups in the region.
In the theoretical part of the argument I show that the rise, development and outcomes of nationalist movements cannot be fully explained without insights from social movement theory. Although I acknowledge the important role of ethnic grievances and national identities, I employ the concepts of social movement theory to demonstrate the central place of political context and the dynamics of contention in understanding nationalist movements. I provide evidence that the Kosovo Serb movement emerged and developed largely in response to changes in political context and within a political environment that was, in comparison with other socialist party-states in Eastern Europe, the least unfavourable to challenger groups. I also show that the development and outcomes of the movement largely depended on its protest strategies and the movement's temporal location in a broader wave of mobilisation. Consequently, I argue that nationalist movements should be studied primarily as a species of social movements.
The rise and fall of the grass roots movement of Kosovo Serbs In late October 1985 a petition from a large group of Kosovo Serbs was sent to both the federal and Serbia's communist leadership. They expressed their grievances 3 about intimidation of, and discrimination against, Kosovo Serbs, and asked for the protection of their human rights and the establishment of law and order. They pointed out that Kosovo was becoming increasingly 'ethnically clean' of Serbs, accused the provincial government of tacit approval of forced migration of Serbs out of Kosovo and demanded that the federal and Serbia's authorities bring that trend to a halt. The petitioners also insisted that their demands be at once put on the agenda of the federal and Serbia's assemblies. The petition was a success. About 2000 people signed it straight away and by April 1986 the number of signatories had multiplied several times, which was much more than anybody had expected. 3 In the early 1980s Kosovo Serbs had voiced their grievances through institutions in vain. When it became apparent that the appeals were ignored, they shifted their efforts to building pressure from the grass roots. In 1985 a small group of political outsiders from Kosovo Polje, a suburb of Pristina with a Serb majority, started mobilising support among Kosovo Serbs for contentious action in order to put pressure on the authorities to take their problems seriously. 4 The success of the October 1985 petition was partly a result of this initiative. Despite a resolute rejection of the demands and threats to organisers from the authorities, there was no immediate persecution, which encouraged the protesters to press their claims again. On a freezing winter morning in late February 1986 a group of 95 people, many of whom were in peasant garb, turned up outside the Federal Assembly in Belgrade. These were informally selected representatives of Kosovo Serbs from 42 towns and villages from all parts of the autonomous province and they demanded to speak to the federal leadership. In the following meeting with top officials planned to set up a tent city somewhere in central Serbia. In this way they wanted to create an emergency situation which the authorities could not ignore. As their feelings fitted well the prevailing mood of Kosovo Serbs, some living in Metohija, in the eastern part of the province, promptly joined the protest. Since the police had already blocked most roads between eastern and central parts of Kosovo, many people, including 70 and 80 year olds and children, proceeded on foot through woods and meadows. After a long march they reached Kosovo Polje, where local protesters joined the group. Just outside Kosovo Polje several high-ranking party officials tried to persuade people to return to their homes but the protesters did not listen. In the end, a cordon of police blocked the road and did not let the protesters go further. After several hours people gave up and quietly returned to their homes. The demands of the movement were at first limited to issues related to law and order and inter-ethnic inequality, and were largely stated in terms of the official discourse. Protesters pointed to mistreatment of Serbs by the Kosovo Albanian majority in Kosovo, including killings, attacks, destroyed crops, seized property and various forms of discrimination based on ethnicity. Since they believed that local and Kosovo party officials deliberately avoided enforcing the law when it came to the rights of Serbs, they demanded their resignations and threatened to collectively leave Kosovo in protest. As divisions within and among officials of the federation, Serbia and Kosovo grew, the demands evolved towards constitutional issues. Between 1967 and 1974 there had been a major shift towards decentralisation in Yugoslavia: Kosovo and Vojvodina, earlier little more than administrative regions of Serbia, were granted a status similar to that of federal units and Serbia effectively lost jurisdiction in these parts of its territory. Since Kosovo 6 Serbs believed that Kosovo's officials were not able, or did not want, to enforce the law when it came to the rights of Serbs, they asked that Kosovo should be brought back under the jurisdiction of Serbia's authorities. They also demanded that consociational arrangements be put in place to give the minority population a say in ruling the province. 8 By late 1986 the movement came close to representing a majority of Serbs in Kosovo. Its main feature was its grass roots composition, because the managerial elite, intellectuals and professionals were largely co-opted by the party. A solid network of activists in towns and villages inhabited by Serbs was rapidly emerging although formal organisations could not be formed. Before the June march the public responses of federal, Serbia's and Kosovo officials were all alike. After the show of commitment to proceed with disruptive action, however, the federal and Serbia's leaderships were somewhat less inclined to refuse to listen to what the protesters were saying. Disputes between Serbia's and Kosovo's officials grew ever more frequent and increasing publicity was given to the movement's demands and protest actions. Leaders of the movement continually appealed to and asked for support from federal and Serbia's officials but were still without influential allies within the leadership. This was to change with the rising influence of Milošević´ within Serbia's leadership.
In the early 1980s Milošević, head of the largest Yugoslav bank, entered the higher party ranks in Serbia. He advanced rapidly within the top leadership, following in the steps of his political mentor and close friend Stambolić, and in 1986 became Serbia's party leader. In April 1987 Milošević paid his first official visit to Kosovo and dropped in to Kosovo Polje. Quite unexpectedly, he faced a crowd of several thousand protesters who passionately chanted 'We want freedom, we want freedom!'. In the chaos that ensued the police started beating protesters with truncheons while they responded by throwing stones at policemen. Milošević then ordered the police to stop beating people and asked the protesters to maintain order themselves, which was accepted with ovations, and the meeting with their representatives continued until early morning. At the end, Milošević delivered a speech, in most part a typical speech of a high-ranking party official. His description of the problem and the need to address it, however, were cast in stronger language than was generally accepted by senior party-state officials. 10 Kosovo Serbs had never before turned out to protest in such numbers and the whole country was shocked by televised scenes of the police beatings of old farmers, workers and housewives, and their stories of suffering. Moreover, never before had a high-ranking party official publicly condemned the police and expressed his solidarity The downside was that the protesters needed to proceed with caution in order not to lose their influential ally. Milošević thus gained influence over the protesters but this often did not translate into actions on the ground. The protest organisers by no means intended to stop collective action until their demands had been fully addressed and at times took action contrary to Milošević's advice. In other cases they followed his instructions but were outvoted, or just ignored, in loose public meetings by other movement activists. Milošević in turn exploited the grass roots mobilisation for his own ends and often provoked activists to publicly denounce his opponents.
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Having Serbia's party leader for an ally, however, did not alter the situation on the ground. Owing to the substantial autonomy of Kosovo, Milošević could only appeal to political leaders of the autonomous province to implement the party's policy on Kosovo, which they often chose to ignore. In response, the movement's organisers launched another petition and sent a large delegation to the federal and Serbia's assemblies in May 1988.
14 They warned that if there were no rapid improvements in the security situation thousands of Serbs would collectively leave Kosovo in protest. Milošević in turn demanded that the organisers prevent a mass exodus and warned them that the party 9 would regard it as counter-revolution. 15 Fearing the prospect of loosing an influential ally and unable to calm people down, the movement's organisers decided to stage a demonstration in Novi Sad, the administrative centre of Vojvodina, instead. In this way they wanted to let off steam and thereby reduce discontent among activists and supporters of the movement but also to protest against the leadership of Vojvodina, Serbia's other autonomous province, and its veto on constitutional changes that would bring the two provinces back under the jurisdiction of Serbia's authorities. 16 On 9 July several hundred Kosovo Serbs turned up in Novi Sad and marched to the city centre, defying the police, again against the advice of Milošević.
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A large crowd of locals gathered spontaneously in their support and, despite unsuccessful attempts by the police to prevent them joining the protest, demanded the resignation of Vojvodina's top officials. The demonstration revealed that popular support for the leadership was minimal and encouraged the movement's organisers to initiate more protests in Vojvodina. Local protesters then took over and attention shifted from the demands of Kosovo Serbs to the general discontent of the local population with their leaders. A wave of protests swept the province and the provincial leadership resigned in early October after being faced with a two-day protest of more than 100,000 people in Novi Sad. 18 In late August and early September the tide had spread to Montenegro and central Serbia. People went onto the streets to declare their support for Kosovo Serbs, rally against local power holders and support Milošević, who was quick to back popular mobilisation. In Serbia, more than three million people attended the rallies. In Montenegro, after initial rallies from August to October to which the authorities responded by repression, protests became overwhelming in January 1989 and the leadership resigned. In November 1988 Kosovo Albanians initiated protests against the purge of Kosovo's officials, which turned into a general strike in late February 1989.
Although the protests were suppressed in March this was the beginning of a decade-long non-violent struggle by Kosovo Albanians. 19 As the protests moved from Kosovo to other parts of Serbia and Montenegro, the movement of Kosovo Serbs gradually lost momentum. That their demands were now on the agenda of the government removed reasons for protest for most supporters of the movement and triggered conflict among its organisers. Milošević, who had now secured popular support, co-opted one of the organisers and forced others to either leave Kosovo or withdraw from public life. 20 Ethnic grievances and national identities Nationalism studies offer important tools for the study of nationalist mobilisation.
Students of nationalism often highlight the sources of nationalist mobilisation and the power of collective identities to sustain collective action. One version of this approach puts emphasis on ancestral ethnic hatreds as the main source and glue of nationalist movements. Another stresses the central place of grievances that arise from inter-ethnic inequalities and memories of earlier conflicts, and national identities. (68.5-67.1% and 27.5% respectively), in the following two decades the proportion of the former increased from 67.1% to 77.4% and that of the latter decreased from 27.5% to 14.9%, 26 and continued to decline throughout the 1980s. Critical to the changes in ethnic composition of the population were demographic factors, the most important of which was a much higher rate of population growth of Kosovo Albanians than of Kosovo's nonAlbanian population. This was the result of an extremely high birth rate among the former, by far the highest in Europe, and a steadily decreasing death rate attributable to improving health care services and the increasing share of young people in the Kosovo Albanian population. In turn, the main causes of the extremely high birth rate were underdevelopment and traditional characteristics of Kosovo Albanian society, especially the subordinate position of women. Therefore, the decreasing proportion of Serbs in a settlement led to a sharp increase in pressure and inequalities, which in turn resulted in emigration.
This finding points to the relative weight of various factors in causing emigration.
Low-level pressure on Serbs as a minority group existed in the whole post-war period.
This included insults, injuries and damage to property and religious and cultural monuments. Another way to assess the relationship between ethnic grievances and the origins of nationalist mobilisation is to shift the focus from the level of grievances to the aggrieved group members' perception of their position and feasible remedies for it. A social condition needs to be recognised as unjust or intolerable and deserving of corrective action in order to have any potential for mobilisation and it is collective action frames that shape grievances into broader and more resonant claims. 31 Indeed, in contrast to the earlier period, in the mid-1980s Kosovo Serb activists identified the problem as that of inter-ethnic inequality and the lack of security for Kosovo Serbs. They redefined their position as unjust, allocated blame for it to Kosovo's party leadership and developed discourse related to human rights and, later, constitutional change, which set the stage for a broad mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs. However, it remains unclear why the framing of 16 ethnic grievances was successful in the mid-1980s and not in the previous decade. To explain the origins of nationalist mobilisation one must look beyond ethnic grievances.
An important factor that conditions the survival of social movements in the face of opposition from political elites and other groups is the power of collective identities to provide links among activists and supporters that survive isolated episodes of collective action. Unlike many other social movements, contemporary nationalist movements need not build such an identity from scratch, as it is already available in the form of national identity. The resilience of nationalist movements in comparison with other movements comes from the presence of an emotional bond similar to that connecting members of a family, which is largely absent in other large social groups. 32 The absence of formal organisations, which would normally impede the expansion of a movement, was compensated in the case of the Kosovo Serb movement by this emotional glue linking its activists and supporters.
Kosovo, in history and epic, has been an important marker of national identity for the Serbs. 33 For one thing, Kosovo was the heartland of the medieval Serbian polity and culture, the territory that still houses the most important historical and religious monuments of the Serbs. For another, the Kosovo legend has long served as a source of resistance to foreign rule and as a tool for preservation of ethnic and national identity.
The legend, partly based on a medieval battle with the Ottomans (1389), says that the Serbian Duke Lazar chose martyrdom as a sacrifice for Serbia rather than servitude. It was created soon after the battle and had a central place in the evolving oral epic tradition of the Serbs during the following centuries. It served as a source of spiritual strength and determination to resist Ottoman rule and, in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, as inspiration for revenge and national liberation of the Serbs. 34 The grass roots movement's activists and supporters saw their current problems only as the last step in the long history of struggle for survival in the region and drew inspiration for their activities from battles that had been fought, in history or legend, by their ancestors. This also partly explains why so many of them were prepared to take the risks linked with collective action in a repressive political context. References to this abound in their appeals 35 despite the movement organisers' efforts to downplay this aspect for tactical reasons, to avoid being labelled counterrevolutionaries. In short, ancestral ethnic hatreds can hardly explain nationalist mobilisation. Grievances that arise from inter-ethnic inequalities and memories of lapsed conflicts as well as national identities account for the intensity of feelings involved in nationalist mobilisation and continuing support for collective action once it is under way. These factors, however, fail to explain the timing and dynamics of nationalist movements. For one thing, it remains unclear why the framing of ethnic grievances occurs on some occasions but not others. For another, mobilisation at times produces unexpected and unintended outcomes, in this case a disproportionate impact by a small peripheral movement on the political process at the centre. This indicates that we need an approach that is more sensitive to political factors. As political scientists who study nationalism are primarily concerned with politics that unfolds within institutions, I
will look into the linkages between institutional and contentious politics and the resulting political dynamics. 
Political opportunities
The concept of political opportunities consists of dimensions of a movement's political environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting people's expectations for success or failure. 37 It includes relatively stable aspects of a movement's political environment and changes in opportunities. 38 Regarding the former, crossnational studies of collective action in contemporary Western democracies show that some states are more open to challenger groups than others according to the criteria of state structure and the state's prevailing strategies towards collective challenges. The impact of state structure is a function of territorial and functional decentralisation, since decentralisation, as opposed to centralisation, implies multiple points of access for challenger groups. 39 Consequently, the states that are more likely to invite collective action are federations and states with extensive regional and local government and those featuring higher autonomy of branches of government and functional bodies. The state's prevailing strategy towards challenger groups maybe inclusive, that is, assimilative and facilitative of their entry into the polity, or exclusive, and its general strategy towards challengers may differ from its strategy regarding particular issues. 41 East European socialist party-states were very exclusive and repressive towards any collective challenges in comparison with democracies and even many non-democratic states in other regions. Although the Yugoslav party-state was less exclusive and repressive than most in Eastern Europe, all attempts to extend the scope of protest outside narrow dissident circles, or to raise questions about the national question outside official discourse, were suppressed. This strategy was not without loopholes. Strong connection with the masses, rooted in the popular-based National Liberation Movement (1941-45), and emancipation of all ethnic groups featured high on the list of legitimising claims of the party. As a result, while there were strict limits to ideological dissidence, party-state officials could not easily dismiss appeals for fair treatment of a minority group, especially when it came from the grass roots. With respect to the stable dimensions of political opportunity, therefore, Yugoslavia provided a less unfavourable political context for collective challenges than any other East European state and this applied especially to non-ideological protest by grassroots groups.
Regardless of the actual configuration of stable dimensions of political opportunity, ordinary people in most periods lack resources to seriously contest the power of political elites and only changes in opportunities may reduce this imbalance of resources and trigger collective action. Changes in opportunities include shifts in political alignments, divisions within and among elites and the emergence of allies of potential challenger groups. Breakdowns of long-standing coalitions of political elites and interest groups and elite conflicts encourage potential challengers with few internal resources to initiate protest and push parts of the elite to look for allies outside the polity. 42 From the perspective of marginal groups, elite allies can provide organisational expertise or offer protection from repression, which is essential as challengers have access to few internal resources in non-democratic states. This partly explains why the early protests by the movement were not immediately suppressed and why the authorities were sensitive to its demands early on.
Within this general framework, the federal and Serbia's leaders had a more inclusive strategy towards the movement while Kosovo's officials, directly engaged in the Without the moderating influence of their allies, the protesters might have opted for radical solutions and, consequently, faced repression. The rise of Milošević´ to power also turned the fortunes of the movement as their protests were accepted as legitimate and prominent activists were shielded from repression. While seeking advice from various quarters, the movement organisers made decisions on strategy and tactics on their own. They firmly believed that people at the grass roots understood their problems best and were therefore able to make appropriate decisions. 46 Leadership succession and generational change also brought about the partial relaxation of repressive rules and regulations and increased space for political debates. In Serbia technocrats of the coming generation led by Stambolić gradually replaced members of Tito's old guard and younger Kosovo Albanian politicians, led by Azem Vllasi, entered the higher ranks of a highly conservative Kosovo leadership. In short, during Tito's rule the authority of the aging president, stable political alignments and the absence of major elite divisions and elite allies effectively discouraged potential challenger groups. The expansion of political opportunities in the early 1980s, including 25 the collapse of old political alignments, mounting elite conflict and the change of party policy towards Kosovo, increased the salience of a highly decentralised political structure and thus helped transform the potential for mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs into collective action.
Repertoires and cycles of collective action
The survival, expansion and outcomes of social movements, including nationalist 
52
On the other hand, the choice of forms of action was shaped by the creative action of the movement's leadership. The novelty of delegations sent since 1986 was that they were designed to make their demands known to the general public as much as to the party leadership. After the arrest of one of the movement leaders in April 1986 a threeday long street demonstration was organised in response. Two months later, a large group of protesters set off on a protest march and threatened to collectively leave Kosovo. Two years later, having obtained powerful allies, the movement organisers opted for more 
Conclusion
The advantages of combining insights from social movement theory and nationalism studies should now be apparent. The study of nationalist movements requires See the eyewitness account in Slavko Ćuruvija, 'Ustav se ne menja pritiscima', Borba, 2-3 July 1988.
